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This paper outlines the institutional history of the 
international narcotic drug control regime. It details the 
evolution of the control system, from its foundations 
at the beginning of the twentieth century – a period of 
mass, unregulated narcotic drug use – to the current 
period. The paper argues that the contemporary control 
model is ill-positioned to address the dynamic and 
rapidly changing nature of the global narcotics trade. 
This paper—a product of the Growth and the Macroeconomics Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to understand the development consequences of crime and conflict. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at j.d.buxton@bradford.ac.uk.
The persistence of anachronistic guiding first principles, 
specifically the utopian idea of prohibition, is identified 
as the key impediment to the adoption of a more humane 
and effective policy approach. But while there is growing 
pressure for a revision of founding ideas, this is not 
supported by a host of powerful actors that includes the 
United States.   
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The international system of narcotic drug control is based on a complex series of 
accords and conventions that are administered by a dedicated drug bureaucracy within 
the United Nations and national level partner agencies. These lock individual nation 
states into the universal goal of eradicating the cultivation, production, distribution 
and consumption of narcotic drugs. The global drug conventions set out a 
comprehensive strategy for the achievement of a ‘drug free world’ - an end to which 
all nation states are obliged to work cooperatively. Underscoring the universal nature 
of the system, by 2005, 180 states were party to the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 175 were party to the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 
and 170 states had ratified the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic.  
The drug control regime is a remarkable model of international collaboration 
and consensus. The core principle underpinning drug control, that states should step in 
and act coercively to prevent the use of dangerous substances, is accepted by all 
national governments regardless of regime type, religion, ideological orientation or 
level of national development. This cohesion of action and principle owes much to the 
longevity of the campaign to prohibit narcotic drugs. The drug control system has 
evolved over a 100-year period and during this time the prohibition model has 
become institutionalized, consolidated and global.  
The foundations of the international quest to eliminate the market for 
intoxicating substances were laid at a meeting of global powers that was held in 
Shanghai in 1909 and which was convened by the US. This was the first significant 
foray by the US on the stage of global diplomacy. Through the anti-drug initiative, the 
US came to define and shape the drug ‘problem’ and responses. The position 
maintained by the U.S. was that the trade in dangerous drugs had to be prohibited. A 
century later, this remains the end goal of the control regime.     
The Shanghai conference was held against the backdrop of global, free and 
mass markets for substances such as opium, cannabis and cocaine, and derivative 
opiates such as morphine and heroin. U.S. steps to control and regulate the trade in 
intoxicating substances was revolutionary given the pervasiveness of ‘drug’ use and 
the powerful vested interests in maintaining an unfettered trade. The U.S. initiative 
also went against a 2,000 year long history of drug cultivation, production, trading 
and use.  
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Drug Use 
People have cultivated and ingested naturally occurring intoxicating and hallucinatory 
substances since the beginning of civilization. The most widely used naturally 
occurring drugs were opium from the opium poppy (papaver somniferum); the 
flowers, leaves and resin of the cannabis plant (cannabis sativa); and the leaves of the 
coca plant (erythroxylum).  
  There were six main reasons for drug consumption in ancient and modern 
societies (Inglis 1975). The most significant was pain relief. Ancient Indian and 
Chinese manuscripts recommended the inhalation or eating of cannabis for a range of 
diseases such as gout, cholera, tetanus, neuralgia and for pain relief in childbirth. 
Underscoring the medicinal value of cannabis, the U.S. pharmacopoeia recommended 
it for the primary treatment of more than 100 illnesses in its publications from 1850 to 
1937. Owing to the presence of 46 alkaloids including the analgesics codeine and 
morphine, opium was also highly valued for medical treatment, beginning with the 
Persians and Greeks. After Greek traders introduced opium to South Asia, the drug 
was used in medical practice in India and China, according to records dating from 400 
A.D. (Booth 1999; Scott 1969).  
The seventeenth century brought the commercialization of medical ‘drug’ use, 
underscored by the launch of Sydenham’s Laudanum, an opium based medication in 
the UK in the 1680s. Competition among apothecaries and rising demand for self-
medication among the new urban working classes in the nineteenth century spurred 
the opium based patent medicine market, with products such as Gowan's Pneumonia 
Cure,  Godfrey’s Cordial and Dr. Moffett's Teethina sold without prescription or 
regulation in grocery stores (Berridge 1981; Hodgson 2001).  
  After the isolation in 1803 of morphine, the analgesic compound in opium, the 
German pharmaceutical firm E. Merck and Company began commercial manufacture 
and morphine-based products such as Winslow’s Soothing Sirup, Children's Comfort, 
Dr. Seth Arnold's Cough Killer and One Day Cough Cure were launched as a superior 
form of pain relief. The popularity of morphine was in turn surpassed by 
diacetylmorphine, which was sold under the brand name Heroin by the German 
company Bayer. First synthesized from boiling morphine in 1874, it was ten times 
stronger than morphine and marketed worldwide as a cure for bronchial problems. 
Indian cultivated cannabis was also commercialized by the burgeoning 
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engaged in its manufacture and marketing.  
  After the active constituent of the coca leaf was identified in 1859 and named 
cocaine, this drug emerged as a popular remedy for a range of physiological and 
psychological illnesses such as allergies, nasal congestion, nymphomania and 
morphine dependence and it was recommended by the British Medical Journal for 
anesthesia in eye surgery. Produced and marketed by Merck and the American firm 
Parke, Davis, cocaine based products such as Ryno’s Hay Fever and Catarrh Remedy 
and Agnew’s Powder, which contained 99 percent and 35 percent pure pharmaceutical 
cocaine respectively, gained mass markets in the US and Western Europe. 
    A second driver of drug use was the need for physical stimulation. Coca, 
cannabis and other natural plant based stimulants such as betel, khat and tobacco were 
traditionally ingested by indigenous and indentured laborers. In the Andean region of 
South America, Spanish colonists encouraged the chewing of coca by indigenous 
workers in the silver mines, as it boosted physical endurance and depressed the 
appetite. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the commercialization of coca 
leaves allowed for the development of a new mass market for stimulant tonics such as 
Vin Mariani, which was first marketed in Europe in 1863 (Streatfeild 2001). Coca 
based stimulants also found a receptive market in the U.S., where French Wine Coca, 
a mixture of wine and cocaine manufactured in Atlanta, was marketed as a ‘brain-
tonic’. It was re-launched in 1886 as Coca-Cola after the alcohol prohibition 
movement objected to the wine content of the product. 
  A third factor accounting for the preponderance of ‘drugs’ was their cultural 
and spiritual significance in religious, pagan, shamanic and cultural ceremonies across 
the world. From the Dagga cults of West Africa, indigenous Indian communities in 
North and South America to Hindu festivals in India, coca leaves, opium, cannabis 
and hallucinogenic plants such as peyote and psilocybin, were used as religious 
sacraments and venerated as gifts from nature or the gods (Schultes and Hoffman 
1992).  
  Cannabis, coca and the opium poppy were also cultivated as a food source. 
Hemp, a member of the cannabis sativa family, produces highly nutritious hemp seed 
and seed oil. It was a staple of rural diets in China, South and Central Asia and the 
Balkan region for centuries. Hemp was also used for rope, rigging, paper making and 
textiles. The utility of hemp was first recognized by the Chinese and its cultivation 
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transplantation by the Spanish conquistadors and Pilgrims, into North and South 
America in the seventeenth century (Herer 1998). This points to a fifth driver of drug 
cultivation – the use of these plants in early bartering and financial systems, the 
Spanish for example transformed coca leaves into one of the most highly 
commercialized products in the Andes by using coca as means of payment.   
  Relaxation, recreation and experimentation were the final factor accounting 
for the popularity of drug use. However, in both ancient and modern societies this was 
the preserve of the elite. The synthetic drug revolution in the second half of the 
nineteenth century did see an increase in recreational drug experimentation, but this 
remained confined to bohemian groups, literary and artistic figures and secret 
societies, who transformed non-medical drug use into a ‘social signifier’ of rejection 
of mainstream society values (Keire 1998). The invention of the injecting syringe in 
1843 did create new recreational as well as medical markets for cocaine and opiates, 
the 1890s Sears Roebuck catalogue for example offering a syringe and vial of cocaine 
for $1.50.  
  A significant exception to the model of elite recreational use was the Chinese 
– and broader South East Asian market for opium. Opium consumption in China was 
common among all social classes and owing to the intensity of demand – and 
addiction - domestic cultivation had to be reinforced by opium imports from India, 
Persia and Turkey. Recreational opium smoking was also common among Chinese 
immigrants scattered across port cities such as London and San Francisco.  
 
The Trade in Drugs 
Drug cultivation and use has persisted across time, but there was a dramatic change in 
patterns of cultivation, production and use during the eighteenth century when opium, 
and to a lesser extent coca, became commercialized. This was catalyzed by Western 
efforts to expand their commercial and colonial presence in Asia. A brief assessment 
of the early opium trade puts into perspective the significance of the U.S. effort to 
regulate and ultimately eliminate what was one of the most important globally traded 
commodities in the international market.         
  Early Portuguese traders were responsible for initiating the ‘mass’ market for 
opium. They first discovered opium poppy cultivation and opium production in India 
after their arrival in the country in 1501. As part of early efforts to enter the Chinese 
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shipped from Brazil. The Dutch deepened the Asian opium market through the 
commercial vehicle the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (V.O.C.), which by the 
1640s had pushed Portugal out of Indonesia and gained control of the profitable trade 
in spices and opium. Indicative of the rapid growth of the Dutch controlled opium 
market after this date, imports of Bengal opium from India into Indonesia increased 
from 0.6 metric tons (m.t.) in the 1660s to 87 m.t. by 1699. The V.O.C. realized 
profits in excess of 400 percent through the re-export of Bengal opium to China and 
as a result of the lucrative nature of the opium enterprise, the spice trade declined in 
value and commercial significance (McCoy 1972; La Motte 2003).   
    The most dramatic change came with the arrival in India in 1608 of the British 
East India Company (E.I.C.), which was originally created to boost Britain’s 
commercial interest in the spice trade. Through military confrontation with the Indian 
opium merchants, the E.I.C. gradually acquired control of the lucrative opium sector 
and absorbed peasant cultivators into a loose syndicate system. Opium for export was 
sold through E.I.C. auction houses in Calcutta, while domestic demand was met 
through the sale of heavily taxed opium through an E.I.C. monopoly of 10,000 retail 
outlets in India.  
    Opium as a commodity was of enormous fiscal and commercial significance 
for Britain, which expanded cultivation in the Bengal area from 90,000 acres in 1830 
to 176,000 in 1840, reaching a high of 500,000 acres by 1900 (McCoy 1972; Richards 
2003). Revenues from opium exports, which climbed from 127 m.t. in 1800 to 6,372 
m.t. by 1857 (Ul Haq 2000: 27) and domestic sales taxes contributed 11 percent of 
total revenues accruing to the British administration in India. Aside from financing 
the colonial enterprise in India and other British territorial possessions in South East 
Asia, opium was intensely valuable to Britain because it reversed a significant balance 
of trade deficit with China. While there was strong demand in the U.K. for Chinese 
goods, such as tea, silk and ceramics, the Chinese market for British manufactured 
exports was limited and no foreign traders were allowed to operate outside of Canton. 
The export of Indian opium to China reversed this negative trade flow. The opium 
trade also enabled Britain to gain a strong commercial foothold in China. As in India, 
this was achieved by Britain’s use of military force. Successive Chinese emperors had 
sought to restrict the use of opium, which was seen as offensive to Confucian 
morality. However, prohibition decrees issued by Emperor Yung Cheng in 1729 and 
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these were repelled by the Chinese, the British government launched naval attacks in 
their defense. Under the resulting peace agreements of the two ‘opium wars’ fought 
between Britain and China in 1839 and 1857, China was forced to open the  treaty 
ports of Amoy, Tinghai, Chunhai and Ningpo to the British, Britain gained Hong 
Kong and the Chinese were forced to legalize the opium trade.  
 
Summary 
When the U.S. convened the first opium conference at the turn of the century, opium 
cultivation and consumption was at an all time high. Production levels were in the 
region of 41,624 m.t. per year, the bulk of which was produced in China in Yunnan 
and Szechwan provinces. The Persian and Ottoman Empires had emerged as 
significant cultivator countries having stepped up opium poppy cultivation and opium 
production in the second half of the nineteenth century in order to meet rising global 
demand. National governments, commercial trading houses and the pharmaceutical 
sector all had significant interests in the opium trade. The colonial powers, U.K., 
Spain and the Netherlands had operated opium retail monopolies across South East 
Asia for over one hundred and fifty years and these contributed to the administrative 
costs of the colonial enterprise. In Java, Indonesia the Dutch administered 1,065 
opium retail outlets, which covered 15 percent of administration costs, while in the 
British colony of Malaya (Malaysia), opium sales contributed 53 percent (McCoy 
1972).  
Further developing the picture of a large global market and commercial 
interest in ‘narcotic’ drugs, coca cultivation had expanded out of native cultivation 
areas in South America such as the Yungas in Bolivia and Huanuco, Libertad and 
Cuzco in Peru. British and Dutch pharmaceutical companies and commercial interests 
transplanted coca leaf cultivation to Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, India, Indonesia 
and British Guyana in order to reduce shipping times and to meet rising demand for 
cocaine. The Dutch had set up cocaine manufacturing facilities in Indonesia following 
the introduction of the coca leaf to Java in 1900 and by the turn of the century, the 
Dutch were the world’s leading cocaine producer (Gootenberg 1999). As with opium 
production, national governments in coca cultivation areas also invested heavily in 
their new comparative advantage, the Peruvian government for example devised a 
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sector (Walker 1996).    
 
Inaction and Detachment: The US and the Early Opium Question 
The US was relatively marginal to the trade in opium, coca and cannabis throughout 
the centuries of the drug market’s operations. It was only at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, when the use of narcotic substances was at a high point, that the US 
became engaged in the nascent drug ‘debate’. When it did so, the country assumed a 
radical posture, pressuring for the complete elimination of the trade, a position that 
‘required little sacrifice from Americans while demanding fundamental social and 
institutional change from others’ (McAllister 2000: 66). 
   This was a belated entry, particularly given that Christian based anti-opium 
campaigns in countries such as the U.K. and India had been mobilizing around the 
‘trade in misery’ for over 30 years. Three factors account for U.S. detachment from 
the opium question during the emerging debates of the mid-nineteenth century. 
Firstly, alcohol, rather than drugs were seen as the most pressing social problem in the 
U.S. The explosion of saloon bars associated with vice, gambling and drunkenness 
catalyzed the emergence of a powerful Christian based prohibition lobby that focused 
political attention on the need for a ban on alcohol rather than regulation of the drug 
trade.  
  Even if the federal government were minded to intervene to regulate 
intoxicating substances it was powerless to act. The constitutional separation of 
powers limited the responsibility of federal government to foreign policy, inter-state 
commerce and revenue raising measures such as taxation. As a result, it could not 
impose legislation on states, which retained jurisdiction over policing, criminal and 
civil law and the regulation of trade and transport (Whitebread 1995). This was 
despite evidence of a rising problem of morphine addiction among women and civil 
war veterans in the second half of the nineteenth century. An estimated 40,000 former 
combatants of the Northern army suffered from ‘soldier’s sickness’ or the ‘army 
disease’, a morphine dependence that followed from its routine administration on the 
battlefield (Ul Haq 2000: 40; Whitebread 1995). Middle class women were the largest 
constituency of American opiate addicts, which totaled an estimated 300,000 people 
out of a population of 76 million. Intra-muscular morphine injection was commonly 
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depression and nymphomania (Courtwright 1982; Keire 1998; Walker 1996: 39).   
  The absence of federal government regulation contrasted with the situation in 
the U.K. where the national government introduced the 1868 Pharmacy Act in 
response to a rise in overdose-related deaths. The U.K. legislation did not restrict the 
sale or use of drugs; it simply required that opiates and cocaine be clearly labeled as 
poisons. It was highly effective in reducing drug-related morbidity, particularly in 
small children. When anti-opium legislation was finally introduced in the U.S. in the 
1870s and 1880s, this was on the initiative of individual states and it was specifically 
targeted at Chinese nationals. It was part of a wider anti-Chinese campaign that was 
led by organizations such as the American Federation of Labor and the Workingmen’s 
Party and it came as part of a package of measures that included restrictions on the 
rights of Chinese immigrants to marry, own property and practice certain professions. 
As such, the first U.S. drug laws were premised on racial prejudice, not a 
preoccupation with national health.  
  A final important factor accounting for the tardiness of US engagement with 
the drug issue was the country’s lack of overseas territorial possessions. Unlike 
Britain, Spain and the Netherlands, the U.S. had no colonial enterprise and the 
country maintained only a marginal trading presence in South East Asia.  As a result, 
it was divorced from the broader debate on the morality of the opium trade and the 
operations of the market more generally. It was alcohol rather than drugs that pre-
occupied the moral conscience of white, Christian U.S. society. 
  It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that a national debate on 
foreign policy and the need for ‘empire building’ began to take hold in the U.S. 
Preoccupation with the consolidation of national territory, unification of North and 
South and prevention of foreign incursion into the Southern hemisphere inhibited 
aspirations of overseas expansion. It was not until 1898 that the U.S. acquired its first 
overseas possession, Hawaii, a move that followed intense pressure for expansion on 
then Republican President McKinley from agricultural, media and financial interests.     
 
US Narco-Diplomacy 
The drastic change in the position of the U.S. federal government, from one of 
detachment from the opium question to leadership on the issue was triggered by the 
acquisition of the Philippines from Spain. This followed the Spanish defeat in the 
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Cuba and Puerto Rico to the U.S. under the Treaty of Paris. Under ongoing pressure 
for U.S. territorial aggrandizement, the McKinley government assumed direct 
responsibility for the Philippines. On the basis that the Philippines had been entrusted 
to the U.S. ‘by the providence of God’, the U.S. set about ‘civilizing’ its people, while 
granting independence to Cuba and Puerto Rico.  
  Having acquired direct responsibility over the Philippines, the US federal 
government was forced to address the opium question. A decision had to be made on 
the retention of the opium retail outlets that had been established by the Spanish, 190 
of which operated in Manila alone. The immediate response of the Governor General 
William Howard Taft was to allow opium sales to continue, with the finances raised 
ring-fenced for education spending. This provoked a vigorous and immediate 
response from Christian missionaries in the Philippines that included the Protestant 
Episcopal Bishop of Manila, Charles H. Brent and Reverend Wilbur Crafts, the 
president of the International Reform Bureau (I.R.B.), the main American missionary 
organization. Brent and Crafts intensively – and successfully - lobbied the federal 
government for a commission of enquiry on opium use in the Philippines.  
  The resulting Philippines Opium Commission of 1903 was the first federal 
government enquiry into the use and effects of intoxicating substances. It was headed 
by Bishop Brent and its findings contradicted those of the earlier British Royal Opium 
Commission, which had been convened in 1895. While the British Commission had 
found opium-related problems in India ‘comparatively rare and novel’, thereby 
legitimizing continued British participation in the trade, the Philippines Commission 
found that the unregulated sale of opium had grave effects on the health and moral 
capacity of users. It recommended that the import, sale and use of opium should be 
based on medical need only, thereby ending a centuries long tradition of unregulated 
and promiscuous use in South East Asia (McAllister 2000). The recommendations of 
the Philippines Opium Commission were accepted by the U.S. Federal government, 
which put in place a three-year transition timetable phasing out the use of opium 
among the 12,000 registered consumers in the Philippines.  
The influence of the Christian Missionaries did not end with this measure. 
Brent and Crafts lobbied the Roosevelt administration to convene an international 
opium conference. This was a significant step and it marked the beginnings of US 
‘narco-diplomacy’. Brent and Crafts argued that without an international agreement to 
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would fail. Two important principles had therefore been set out by the influential 
missionary groups. Firstly, that the use of intoxicating substances was morally wrong 
and injurious and that national governments had the responsibility to step in to 
prevent people from doing harm to themselves. Secondly, that this could only be 
achieved by reducing the supply of narcotic substances from cultivator and producer 
countries. This prohibitionist, supply-side focused thrust shaped the structure and 
orientation of the international control regime that was to emerge.  
 
The Shanghai Opium Conference 
All of the great powers, with the exception of the Ottoman Empire, accepted the US 
invitation to participate in an international opium conference, on the understanding 
that participants did not have plenipotentiary powers and consequently national 
governments would not be bound by a final resolution.   
  The emphasis on prohibition that informed the views of the U.S. delegation to 
the meeting was a minority position. The British, Dutch and other significant 
stakeholder countries were prepared to concede the need for regulation of the opium 
trade, but they emphasized regulation over prohibition. The British had already 
moved toward a ten year supply-reduction agreement with China, were an estimated 
one in four males where addicted to the drug. This 1907 Anglo-Chinese accord 
proved highly successful in reducing opium cultivation and availability. There was 
also a strong view that banning opium would be futile – particularly given the scale of 
the sector - and counterproductive. In previous experiences, the prohibition of 
substances ranging from coffee to wine and tobacco, black-markets had flourished 
while illicit supply and demand had persisted. Moreover, the U.S. delegation’s 
emphasis on enforcement of prohibition through punishment of ‘offenders’, as 
proposed by the U.S. Opium Commissioner and head of the U.S. delegation Dr 
Hamilton Wright, was viewed as punitive and extreme. These divisions between the 
U.S. and other participant countries: ‘remained central points of contention for 
decades’ (McAllister 2000: 29).    
  Although no concrete agreement came out of Shanghai, the meeting was of 
enormous significance. It laid the foundations for international dialogue on opium and 
other drugs. This was fully capitalized on by the U.S. missionary groups that had 
placed themselves at the helm of the anti-opium campaign. They successfully lobbied 
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narco-diplomacy also forced the introduction of domestic anti-drug legislation in the 
U.S. It was recognized that the U.S. would have no credibility on the international 
stage if domestic restrictions were not in place but a circuitous route had to be devised 
in order that that the federal administration could bypass constitutional obstacles to 
national regulation. In 1906, the Pure Food and Drug Act was introduced as an 
exercise in the right of federal government to regulate interstate commerce. As with 
the earlier British Pharmacy Act, this did not prohibit drug use, it simply required that 
alcohol, morphine, opium, cocaine, heroin, chloroform and cannabis contents were 
labeled on medicines and tonics.  
  Although the new law was successful in reducing the use of patent medicines 
(Courtwright 1982), it did not meet the Christian lobby position that all non-medicinal 
drug use should be banned as consumption was immoral, degrading and dangerous. 
This principle was not realized in legislative form until 1909, when the Federal 
government introduced the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act in line with its 
constitutional right to regulate overseas trade. This prohibited the import of opium for 
non-medicinal purposes, making the 1909 law the first federal measure banning the 
non-medical, ‘recreational’ use of a substance.  
  The Exclusion Act was a triumph for the Christian Missionary lobby, but the 
strategy for achieving support for the Act’s introduction was divisive. There was a 
strong reliance on the use of racist language and imagery to galvanize popular and 
political support for strict anti-drug measures and this was to become a core feature of 
anti-drug measures in the U.S. In his role as the first U.S. drug ‘tsar’ Hamilton Wright 
worked with William Randolph Hearst’s newspaper empire to generate concern 
around substance use among minority groups. In an interview with the New York 
Times  in March 1911, Wright focused public and media attention on the dangers 
posed to white American society by cocaine use among African Americans. This was 
further developed in the Literary Digest and Good Housekeeping, were Wright 
elaborated on the danger posed to white women by ‘negro cocaine peddlers’ and 
‘cocainized nigger rapists’. These ‘Negro fiends’ with cocaine induced superhuman 
strengths easily substituted for the opium wielding Chinese ‘devils’ of the earlier anti-
opium propaganda. Public pressure for action was in turn channeled toward domestic 
legislation in the U.S., while strengthening the hawkish, prohibition oriented position 
of the U.S. delegation to The Hague conference of 1911.  
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Building the Early Control Regime 
The 1912 International Opium Convention  
Between The Hague meeting of 1911 and the outbreak of the Second World War, 
substantial progress was made in creating the founding structures of the international 
control regime. In contrast to the Shanghai meeting, delegates to The Hague did have 
plenipotentiary powers and as a result, participating countries were bound by the 
resulting International Opium Convention. This ‘raised the obligation to co-operate in 
the international campaign against the drug evil from a purely moral one to the level 
of a duty under international law’ (May 1950).  
 The  Convention  institutionalized the principle that medical need was the sole 
criterion for the manufacture, trade and use of opiates and cocaine. National 
governments were thereby required to enact ‘effective laws or regulations’ to control 
production and distribution and to restrict the ports through which cocaine and opiates 
were exported. While the Convention was a groundbreaking document, it did not 
create mechanisms to oversee implementation of the agreement, nor did it set targets 
for reducing the volume of drugs manufactured. It was also loosely worded and, most 
problematic of all, could only come into effect if unanimously approved. Amid 
mounting suspicion and enmity between governments in the drift to war in 1914, 
consensus was difficult to achieve and only China, The Netherlands, the U.S., 
Honduras and Norway ratified the Convention (Bewley Taylor 2001; McAllister 
2000).  
  The First World War removed the obstacles to ratification and administration 
of the Opium Convention. Firstly, Austria Hungary and the Ottoman Empire - 
reluctant supporters of the measure - were defeated in the conflict and this made it 
possible to craft a new consensus and for the U.S. and West European powers to 
impose the Convention. This was done by conjoining ratification of the Convention to 
the Versailles Peace Agreement of 1919 (McAllister 2000). Secondly, the League of 
Nations was created in the aftermath of the First ‘Great War’ and this provided the 
international community with a centralized body for the administration of the 
Convention. 
On assuming responsibility for overseeing the Opium Convention, the League 
created specialized support bodies that included the Opium Section, which provided 
administrative and executive support to the League Council, and the Health 
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advised the League’s Secretariat on drug related matters. The most important and 
specialized of these bodies within the new control regime was the Advisory 
Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, known as the Opium 
Advisory Committee (O.A.C.), which in turn created the Opium Control Board to 
assist it in its duties. 
  From this institutional foundation, the League went on to incrementally 
develop a comprehensive control regime. Knowledge and operational gaps in the 
system were identified and addressed through follow up conferences and the 
introduction of new conventions. This process of building up the control system 
proceeded with two conferences in Geneva in 1924 that sought to address the 
problems encountered by the O.A.C. in developing a comprehensive picture of the 
‘legitimate’ medical drug market.  
 
The Geneva Convention 
The Geneva Convention of 1928 expanded the manufacturing control system by 
establishing compulsory drug import certificates and export authorizations that were 
to be administered by national authorities and which were required for all drug 
transactions between countries. This sought to prevent countries importing or 
exporting drugs beyond medical and scientific requirement. In order to determine the 
level of legitimate medical drug requirements, parties to the Convention were to 
provide annual statistics estimating production, manufacture and consumption 
requirements for opiates, coca, cocaine and, for the first time in drug control, 
cannabis. This information was to be supplemented by quarterly statistics detailing the 
volume of plant based and manufactured drugs imported and exported and estimated 
figures for opium smoking. A new drug control organ, the eight-person Permanent 
Central Opium Board (P.C.O.B.), which replaced the Opium Control Board, assumed 
responsibility for processing the statistical information. The P.C.O.B. had the 
authority to request explanations from national governments if they failed to submit 
statistical information or if stated drug import or export requirements were overshot. 
The Board could also recommend an embargo of drug exports or imports on any 
country that exported or imported in excess of stated production levels or medical 
need. This extended to countries that were not party to the Convention, universalizing 
the control system. Aside from refining the institutional structure and remit of drug 
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regime and created an open-ended schedule that classified drugs according to their 
danger to health and relevance to science.  
The 1924 Geneva conference also resulted in a second convention, The 
Agreement Concerning the Manufacture of, Internal Trade in, and Use of Prepared 
Opium, which came into force in 1926. This established a 15-year timetable for the 
elimination of recreational opium use in Southeast Asia.   
 
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs 
The Geneva Convention failed to prevent legitimately manufactured drugs seeping 
into the illegitimate market. The O.A.C. determined that between 1925 and 1929, 
legitimate demand for opium and cocaine based drugs was in the region of 39 tons per 
year, while one hundred tons of opiates had been exported to unknown destinations 
from licensed factories (Anslinger and Tompkins 1953). A follow up conference, 
addressing this weakness resulted in the 1931 Convention for Limiting the 
Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs. The Convention set 
out that the quantity of manufactured drugs required globally was to be fixed in 
advance. This was to be determined by a compulsory estimates system, under which 
all countries were required to detail the quantities of drugs required for medical and 
scientific purposes for the coming year. The system of indirect limitations was 
administered by a new body, the four-person Drug Supervisory Board (D.S.B.), which 
was authorized to draw up its own estimates of individual country needs as a means of 
checking the information submitted and it devised estimates for those countries that 
did not submit their drug requirements. No greater quantity of any of the drugs set out 
in the D.S.B. final report was to be manufactured.  
In a further tightening of the control regime, the P.C.O.B. was empowered 
under the 1931 Convention to directly embargo any country that exported or imported 
beyond its stated manufacturing volumes or consumption needs. Signatory states were 
also required to establish a dedicated national drug enforcement agency to ensure 
compliance with domestic drug laws that had been introduced at the local level in line 
with international obligations.   
 
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 
  15The final element of the inter-war control regime was the 1936 Convention for the 
Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, an initiative of the International 
Police Commission, the forerunner of Interpol. Unlike previous conventions, which 
sought to demarcate a legitimate trade in medical drugs, the 1936 Convention 
addressed the illegal market. It imposed punitive and uniform criminal penalties for 
trafficking illicit substances, with Article 2 of the Convention recommending that 
national anti-trafficking laws should be based on ‘imprisonment, or other penalties of 
deprivation of liberty’. National governments were obliged to set up a dedicated 
agency responsible for monitoring drug traffickers and trafficking trends, in co-
ordination with corresponding agencies in other countries. 
 
Table 1: Pre-World War Two Drug Conventions 
Date, Place 
Signed 
Title of Convention  Into Force 
January 1912, The 
Hague  
International Opium Convention   Feb. 1915 and 
June 1919 
Feb. 1925, Geneva   Agreement concerning the Manufacture of, 
Internal Trade in, and Use of Prepared Opium 
July 1926 
Feb. 1925, Geneva  International Opium Convention  Sept. 1928 
July 1931, Geneva   Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and 




Agreement for the Control of Opium 




Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit 
Traffic in Dangerous Drugs 
Oct. 1939 
 
Evaluating the Inter-War Control Regime 
The international community made remarkable progress in working collectively (an 
unprecedented development in itself) to control the supply of harmful substances. In 
1933, the O.A.C. reported that: ‘the sources of supply [of drugs] in Western Europe, 
as a result of the close control now exercised, appear to be rapidly drying up’ 
(Renborg 1964). World opium production declined 82 percent between 1907 and 
1934, from 41,624 tons to an estimated 16,653 tons. Legitimate Heroin production fell 
from 20,000 pounds in 1926 to 2,200 pounds by 1931. South East Asia, the biggest 
‘problem’ market saw a 65 percent fall in opium sales and in the Netherlands Indies 
(Indonesia), there was an 88 percent fall in opium consumption (McCoy 1972). This 
was a major achievement given the difficulties inherent in negotiating a universal 
  16agreement that had to reconcile diverse and competing interests, ensure an adequate 
global supply of medical drugs while altering patterns of individual behavior. The 
control model was all the more remarkable as it was a first step in the direction of 
states surrendering overview of their sovereign affairs to an international body. Drug 
control was also groundbreaking as it led to the introduction of uniform penal 
sanctions across countries and established principles of criminal law on an 
international basis.   
  The instauration of a comprehensive substance control regime was a major 
success for the U.S. Christian lobby groups that had first initiated the drug control 
discourse at the turn of the twentieth century. The U.S. was able to pull dissenting 
national voices into the system and override competing regulatory proposals as a 
result of two key factors: evolving attitudes toward the drug trade in Europe and 
astute U.S. diplomacy.  
  As understanding of addiction and dependence evolved, West European states 
acknowledged the need for a stronger control framework, a paternalist orientation that 
was reinforced by the creation of rudimentary welfare state systems that afforded 
government responsibility for the heath of citizens. The roll out of European welfare 
state additionally eliminated the need for self-medication, further legitimizing medical 
and political arguments in favor of controlled drug use (Berridge 2001).  
  This is not to suggest that European and other governments were in full accord 
with the prohibition orientation of the U.S., which was the driving force behind the 
introduction of increasingly punitive sanctions in the Conventions. The Dutch, 
British, French and Spanish all remained skeptical of the U.S. view that recreational 
drug use could be terminated through ‘shock’ strategies and they remained convinced 
of the importance of medical support for drug users over the penal approach 
advocated by the U.S. Moreover they did not accept that cultivation of opium or coca 
could be rapidly eradicated and on this issue they did achieve a significant victory 
over the U.S. by introducing a protracted 15 year timeframe for cultivation controls. 
As a result, by 1939, state opium monopolies continued to operate in Burma, British 
Malaya, Netherlands Indies, Siam, French Indo-China, Hong Kong, Macao, Formosa 
and Kwantung Leased Territory. Overall however, the U.S. delegation was effective 
in defining the shape and orientation of the control system – largely because of 
political posturing and by acting on the outside of the League of Nations.  
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it finally did in 1924. It was primarily through concern that the U.S. would withdraw 
from the body that European powers acceded influence to the U.S. on drug related 
matters. U.S. representatives at the drug conferences and within the control bodies, 
such as Harry J. Anslinger, director of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Herbert 
May of the P.C.O.B. were forceful individuals and: ‘their beliefs, morals, ambitions 
and single-minded determination enabled them to exert exceptional influence over the 
shape of the international drug control regime’ (Sinha 2001). When the American 
position was rejected, the U.S. withdrew from proceedings. Ironically the U.S. was 
not party to the most important founding conventions including the 1928 Geneva 
Convention and the 1936 trafficking convention, on the grounds that they were not 
rigorous enough (Bewley Taylor 2001; McAllister 2000; Sinha 2001). The U.S. also 
signed bilateral policing agreements with 22 countries during the inter-war period. 
While this went against the spirit of cooperation that the League was seeking to 
create, it allowed the U.S. to extradite and prosecute drug traffickers independent of 
the international control system (Anslinger and Tompkins 1953).  
  Consequently the drug control framework that evolved reflected the core 
values of the U.S. and the internationalization of prohibition oriented ideas and 
approaches that were culturally unique to the U.S. Owing to the influence of the U.S. 
the control model that emerged was skewed toward supply, as opposed to demand 
focused activities, it emphasized punishment and suppression over consideration of 
why people cultivated, produced and used drugs and it institutionalized the influence 
of the police, the military, politicians and diplomats while the opinion of stakeholders 
such as doctors, drug users and peasant cultivators were marginalized (Sinha 2001).  
Underscoring a further ‘internationalization’ of American approaches to drugs,  
there was a growing reliance on the demonization of drug users in order to justify 
repressive domestic legislative measures such as the 1919 Dutch Opium Act, the 1929 
German Opium Act and the 1920 British Dangerous Drugs Act. The emphasis on 
embattled nations under attack from subversive forces seeking to enslave, poison and 
infiltrate the country, of dangerous substances, threatening ‘out groups’ and 
criminality, all of which was prevalent in early U.S. anti-drug propaganda, became a 
stock element of international counter-narcotics propaganda and ‘education’. These 
stereotypes of drug users remain prevalent today (Reinarman and Levine 1997). 
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federal government labored around the constitutional separation of powers to 
introduce strict, national prohibition measures. The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 
1914 and the Marijuana Taxation Act of 1937 were introduced as taxation based 
measures, in line with the jurisdiction of the federal government. They imposed 
punitively high taxes on the non-medical exchange of cocaine and opiates, in the case 
of the former and cannabis transactions, including the sale of industrial hemp, in the 
case of the 1937 measure. Under the Harrison Act doctors had to register with federal 
authorities, record all drug transactions and pay a prescription tax. Any individual 
caught in possession of cocaine or opiates without a prescription was consequently 
charged with tax evasion rather than a criminal offence (Whitebread 1995). After 
1922, doctors were not allowed to prescribe ‘narcotic drugs’ to addicts to maintain 
their addiction (Berridge 2001; Courtwright 1982; Whitebread 1995). The Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, which was created in 1930 and presided over by Harry J. 
Anslinger for thirty years, assumed a lead role in disseminating anti-drug propaganda 
and acculturalizing Americans to the  new drug laws. Among the reams of shockingly 
racist articles from the period was a New York Times piece by Edward Huntington 
Williams. This claimed that cocaine made African-Americans resistant to bullets. 
(New York Times, February 8 1914). In the Congressional hearings into the 1914 
Harrison bill, the head of the State Pharmacy Board of Pennsylvania, Christopher 
Koch testified that: ‘Most of the attacks upon the white women of the south are the 
direct result of the cocaine-crazed Negro brain’ (New York Times, Feb. 8, 1914). In 
the build up to the 1937 Marijuana Tax Act, Mexican migrants emerged as the new 
drug threat. It was claimed that ‘marijuana crazed Mexicans’ were committing violent 
acts after smoking the ‘loco weed’. By emphasizing the threat faced by American 
society, the F.B.N. was positioned to substantially increase its share of federal 
revenues. 
  After the alcohol prohibition movement was successful in amending the 
Constitution and achieving national prohibition in 1918, key activists such as 
Richmond Pearson Hobson of the Anti-Saloon League shifted their attention to the 
anti-drug campaign. Pearson formed the International Narcotic Education Association 
in the early 1920s and this organization was responsible for distributing racist, 
eugenicist, hyperbolic and medically incorrect ‘information’ about the ‘Narcotic 
Peril’. Support and pressure for drug prohibition persisted even after alcohol 
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been a failure and that there were important lessons – that were not learned - from the 
experience. Even though alcohol prohibition had generated a flourishing, difficult to 
police, gangster dominated illicit industry worth millions of dollars, pressure for 
domestic and international drug prohibition persisted and was institutionalized in the 
contemporary drug control framework that evolved after World War Two.   
 
The Contemporary Drug Control Regime    
While the First World War provided a strategic opportunity to advance the principle 
of drug control, World War Two enabled the U.S. to consolidate control of the drug 
control regime and apparatus. The framework that developed after 1945 addressed the 
priorities of the U.S. specifically: the prohibition of opium smoking; restrictions on 
drug plant cultivation; extension of the control system to cannabis and other drugs; 
enhanced policing and enforcement and the application of punitive criminal sentences 
for those engaged in illicit plant cultivation, drug production, trafficking, 
transportation, distribution, possession and use (Bruun, Pan and Rexed 1975). The 
capacity of the U.S. to consolidate its influence can be attributed to a number of 
factors that included the geo-strategic changes induced by the conflict and the 
exercise of U.S. political pressure and leverage.  
The work of the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory 
Board was transferred from Geneva to Washington in 1941. Reliant on federal 
funding, both bodies experienced a ‘considerable loss of freedom’ (McAllister 2000: 
146) as they were required to submit technical information to the U.S. government 
and assist in the development of new anti-drug policies. The War also provided the 
U.S. with a strategic foothold in South East Asia. At a 1943 meeting with 
representatives from Britain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands the U.S. won the 
guarantee that opium monopolies would not be re-established in colonial territories 
invaded by Japan that were liberated with the help of, or by the U.S. The subsequent 
offensive U.S. military presence in the region enabled America to impose its model of 
prohibition. Opium dens and retail outlets were closed down by U.S. troops and on 
conclusion of the war, strict anti-drug legislation was introduced by the American 
administration in West Germany and Japan. The diplomatic environment also allowed 
for negotiations with opium cultivating neutral governments such as Iran, Turkey and 
  20the Yugoslavian governments in exile and this allowed for preliminary agreements on 
cultivation controls.  
  In the aftermath of the War, the Lake Success protocol of 1946 transferred 
administration of the drug conventions from the defunct League of Nations to the 
newly established United Nations. The U.N. Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) acquired primary responsibility for overseeing the conventions, and it was 
supported in this task by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (C.N.D.), which advised 
ECOSOC on drug-related matters and prepared draft international agreements. As 
such, the C.N.D. supplanted the Opium Advisory Committee. In a further innovation 
to existing control institutions, administrative support that had been provided by the 
Opium Section was transferred to a new body, the Division of Narcotic Drugs 
(D.N.D.) The P.C.O.B. and D.S.B. were transferred back to Geneva from 
Washington, were they continued in their role compiling statistics from national 
estimates and administering the import / export certification system. 
  Another new institution, the World Health Organization (W.H.O.) assumed 
the drug advisory responsibilities formerly exercised by the Health Committee of the 
League of Nations. The Drug Dependence Expert Committee of the W.H.O. was in 
turn given the task of determining the addictive potential of drugs and their position 
on the international schedule of controls (Fazey 2003). 
 
The Paris Protocol 
While there had been a collapse in illicit drug trafficking during the war, the 
international community had to address complex legacies of the conflict, such as 
stockpiles of medical opium and semi-synthetic drugs and a burgeoning problem of 
the dependence on new synthetic drugs such as methadone and pethidine, which had 
been developed during the war but fell outside of the control schedule established by 
the 1931 Convention. The first post war drugs conference resulted in the 1948 Paris 
Protocol. This brought any drug liable to cause harm into the schedule of controlled 
drugs and required states to inform the U.N. secretary-general of any new drug 
developed that had the potential to produce harmful effects. The progress of the new 
Convention was not without contention, with the Soviet Union reluctant to 
acknowledge the authority of the U.N. bodies on the issue, or the existence of a drug 
problem within its territory. Similarly efforts to restrict opium cultivation proposed by 
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insufficient stocks of medical opium.  
The resulting 1953 Opium Protocol was a compromise measure. It extended 
the import and export control system for manufactured drugs to opium poppy 
cultivation and cultivating countries were required to detail the amount of opium 
poppy planted and harvested and volumes of opium exported, used domestically and 
stockpiled. While this marked a significant step forward for the U.S., the reporting 
requirements were not extended to coca after Andean countries maintained that coca 
cultivation was integral to indigenous life and culture. However, by the time the 
Opium Protocol came into force in 1963, it was a redundant instrument as a result of 
the 1961 Single Convention.                 
 
  Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs   
The 1961 Convention followed from a meeting of 73 countries to explore a single, 
anti-drug convention that would consolidate the nine drug conventions introduced 
since The Hague conference of 1911. The resulting Single Convention consolidated 
past convention provisions; it introduced controls in new areas; it revised the existing 
control apparatus and it was a major success for the U.S. in terms of advancing the 
country’s drug control agenda.   
  The Single Convention extended the system of licensing, reporting and 
certifying drug transactions to all raw ‘narcotic’ plant materials including cannabis 
and coca leaves. Cultivator countries were required to establish national monopolies 
to centralize and then phase out cultivation, production and consumption, over a 25-
year period in the case of coca and 15 years in the case of opium poppies, culminating 
in a full international prohibition of the non-medical cultivation and use of these 
substances by 1989. The Convention further required immediate domestic legislation 
to prohibit the non-medicinal use of opium, cocaine and cannabis (which the U.S. 
maintained was a ‘gateway drug’), and in a further tightening of restrictions on 
medicinal consumption, a new classification schedule was introduced. Drugs 
considered addictive and ‘obsolete’ in terms of their scientific and medical value, 
such as opium poppy, coca and cannabis and their derivatives were classified as 
schedule I or IV. Drugs that were considered less dangerous and of some medical 
value were classified as Schedule II or III were (Bewley Taylor 2001; Fazey 2003; 
Sinha 2001).  According to Article One of the Convention, drugs presented: ‘a serious 
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such, signatory states were required to introduce more punitive domestic criminal 
laws that punished individuals for engagement in all aspects of the illicit drug trade.  
Intended as a ‘final’ and definitive document, the 1961 Convention also 
restructured the international drug control apparatus. The P.C.O.B. and the D.S.B. 
were merged to create a thirteen-person body of independent experts, the International 
Narcotics Control Board (I.N.C.B.), which evaluated national statistical information, 
monitored the import-export control system and authorized narcotic plant cultivation 
for medical and scientific need. These powers were subsequently extended under a 
1972 amendment, which gave the I.N.C.B. responsibility for developing and 
implementing programs to prevent the cultivation, production, manufacture, 
trafficking and use of illicit drugs and for advising countries that needed assistance in 
complying with the Conventions. The amendment also addressed extradition and 
required that any bilateral agreement automatically include drug-related offences. 
While the thrust of the 1961 Convention was toward a tightening of criminal 
sanctions, the 1972 amendment did introduce an important shift toward addressing 
demand-side issues. Parties to the 1961 Convention were now requested to provide 
‘treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration’ for drug 
addicts and users.  
   
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances 
Although the Single Convention was intended as ‘a convention to end all 
conventions’ (May 1950) the international community met in 1971 in order to   
respond to the advances in chemistry and synthetic drug manufacture which had led to 
new mass markets for psychotropic substances such as amphetamines, barbiturates  
and hallucinogens that were not incorporated into the existing regulatory framework.  
The resulting Psychotropic Convention introduced a regulatory regime for these drugs 
modeled on the manufacturing and cultivation control system set out in the 1961 
Convention. This included a schedule of four levels of control that were based, like 
the Single Convention, on a drug’s therapeutic value and abuse potential.  
  The 1961 and 1971 Conventions were followed through at the domestic level 
by repressive domestic drug policies. There was a  significant enhancement of police 
powers to stop, search, raid, hold without charge and electronically tap suspected 
traffickers, dealers and drug users, while the death sentence or mandatory life 
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introduced. For critics of the approach, the uniformity of strategies owed much to the 
pressure on regimes stemming from ‘youth rebellion’, protest movements, 
revolutionary ideologies, social experimentation and profound East-West tensions. In 
this interpretation, repressive, penal oriented measures made it possible to suppress 
political dissent (Gamella and Jiménez Rodrigo 2004). 
  The domestic response in the U.S. was particularly noteworthy as it marked a 
deepening of U.S. unilateralism in drug’s strategy and a broader incorporation of 
counter-narcotics policy into foreign policy. The Nixon administration launched a 
‘war on drugs’ in 1969 that was followed by the introduction of the 1970 Controlled 
Substances Act (C.S.A.). The C.S.A., which is the basis for contemporary U.S. drug 
policy, brought together all previous federal drug legislation. It established a series of 
schedules, with cannabis among a number of drugs classified as the most dangerous 
drugs, or Schedule One narcotics, and it was enforced by a new agency, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.), which was created in 1973 following from the 
closure of the F.B.N.   
The ‘war on drugs’ was re-launched by President Reagan, who in a 1982 
speech outlined a new aggressive posture: ‘We’re taking down the surrender flag … 
we’re running up the battle flag’ (New York Times, 24 June 1982). The Reagan 
administration marked the introduction of a plethora of punitive anti-drug measures 
that included the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act; the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act; the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Amendment Act and the 1988 Drug Free Workplace 
Act. These measures raised federal penalties for all drug-related offences, introduced 
mandatory minimum sentences, asset seizure without conviction and they established 
the federal death penalty for drug ‘kingpins’ (Chase Eldridge 1998). The Reagan 
period also saw the introduction of the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) 
anti-drug program in schools and in 1986 drug testing of federal employees and 
contractors under Executive Order 12564. This was coordinated by a new agency, the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy which was created by the 1988 National 
Narcotics Leadership Act.     
  This domestic legislative momentum continued into the 1990s and 2000s with 
the model 1999 Drug Dealer Liability Act that imposed civil liability on drug dealers 
for the direct or indirect harm caused by the use of the drugs that they distributed. In 
2000 the Protecting Our Children from Drugs Act imposed mandatory minimum 
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who distributed near schools (Chase Eldridge 1998).      
Of crucial significance, the U.S. ‘drug war’ was also characterized by the 
stepping up of ‘source-focused’ policies of cultivation eradication, with a specific 
focus on South America. In the mid-1980s, the Federal government introduced the 
drug certification system which terminated bilateral assistance to any country deemed 
by the State Department not to be co-operating in the drug war. There was also an 
intense militarization of eradication and interdiction strategies, with the U.S. pressing 
for and financing the deployment of source country military institutions in 
enforcement activities. This escalation of unilateral U.S. counter-narcotics activities 
led to a sharp increase in the federal government’s drug budget expenditures, from 
$1.8bn in 1981 to $12.5 billion by 1993. The D.E.A.’s share of these revenues 
increased from $200 million to $400 million (Gray 2000), with additional finances 
available through the 1984 civil forfeiture law, which allowed enforcement agencies 
to confiscate drug-related assets. By the end of the 1980s, the 1984 law contributed in 
the region of $500 million to the Drug Enforcement Agency, while the Justice 
Department received an estimated $1.5 billion in illegal assets between 1985 and 
1991 (Blumenson and Nilsen 1998). 
 
1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances 
The final convention of the current drug control system was negotiated in 1988. As 
with the pre-war drug control system, this related to the traffic in illicit substances and 
it addressed mechanism to strengthen compliance with the control regime. The 
Convention required states to co-operate and co-ordinate anti-trafficking initiatives 
with international enforcement bodies and partner agencies in other countries and, in 
response to the new challenges posed by the globalization of trade and services, it 
called on states to introduce domestic criminal legislation to prevent money 
laundering and to allow for asset seizure and extradition. The Convention also 
introduced controls of chemical precursors required for the production of synthetic 
and semi-synthetic drugs, with states obliged to monitor the manufacture and trade in 
chemicals that could be used in illicit drug production. It additionally set out 
procedures for the harmonization of national drug laws, setting out specific offences 
that individual states were required to legislate against.    
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Table 2. The Post-War Drug Conventions   
  Date and Place 
Signed 
Title of Agreement  Date of Entry into 
Force 
Dec. 1946, Lake 
Success, New York, 
USA 
Protocol amending the Agreements, 
Conventions and Protocols on 
Narcotic Drugs concluded at The 
Hague on 23 January 1912, at 
Geneva on 11 February 1925 and 19 
February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at 
Bangkok on 27 November 1931, and 
at Geneva on 26 June 1936. 
Dec. 1946 
Nov. 1948, Paris, 
France 
Protocol Bringing under 
International Control Drugs outside 
the Scope of the Convention of 13 
July 1931 for Limiting the 
Manufacture and Regulating the 
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as 
amended by the Protocol signed at 




New York, USA 
Protocol for Limiting and Regulating 
the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, 
the Production of, International and 




New York, USA 










Protocol amending the Single 




Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
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the drug control regime continued to evolve. In 1991, the separate, geographically 
dispersed U.N. agencies responsible for administering the conventions were unified 
under the United Nations Drug Control Program (U.N.D.C.P.). This new body, which 
derived its authority from the C.N.D., absorbed the D.N.D. and the I.N.C.B. As part 
of this restructuring process, membership of the C.N.D. was expanded from 40 
countries to 53, with seats allocated on the basis of the geographical groupings within 
the U.N. (Fazey 2003).  
  In response to the growing inter-linkages between illicit trafficking activities, 
such as small arms, narcotics and humans, there was a further streamlining of 
agencies in 1997. The U.N.D.C.P. was merged with the Centre for International 
Crime Prevention to form the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention (U.N.O.D.C.C.P.) and in 2002 this agency became the U.N. Office on 
Drugs and Crime (U.N.O.D.C.).    
 




Economic and Social Council 
 
Discusses and analyses drug-related 
issues; Initiates drug-related studies; 
Drafts Conventions; Convenes drug 
conferences. 
  
Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs 
Analyses drug traffic and 
trends; Advises ECOSOC; 
Prepares draft international 
drug agreements; Provides 





International Narcotics Control 
Board 
Control organ for the implementation of 
the drug control treaties; Provides 
advice to the W.H.O.; Determines 
worldwide medical and scientific drug 
requirements; Processes technical and 
statistical information provided by 
states; Allocates cultivation, production, 
manufacture, export, import and trade 
quotas; Advises status on anti-drug 
measures. 
United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime 
Co-ordinates U.N. anti-drug 
activities; Provides 
secretariat services for the 
C.N.D. and I.N.C.B.; 
Advises countries on 
implementation of the drug 
conventions; Executes anti-
drug initiatives in host 
countries.   
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    Although the drug control regime has reached a high point in terms of its 
universalism, comprehensiveness and institutional integrity, it is also under 
unprecedented pressure and there are indications that the consensus underpinning the 
model is fracturing. The cultivation, production and consumption of illicit substances 
is at an all time high and drug markets have become more complex, dynamic and 
diversified. This situation has forced a questioning of first principles. There is a 
growing acknowledgement that the historically entrenched ideology of prohibition 
that underpins the control regime is anachronistic, counterproductive and 
unachievable. European and South American countries have taken the lead in 
experimenting with regulatory and liberalization oriented strategies, a move that has 
been informed by the failure of the highly repressive approaches that were pursued in 
the 1970s and 1980s (Dolin 2001; E.M.C.D.D.A. 2001; Gatto 1999; Fazey 2003). 
This focus on demand-side issues has run parallel with a revision of strategy in 
‘supply’ countries. The Europeans in particular now place emphasis on ‘alternative 
development’ policy in cultivator states, a position that acknowledges the persistence 
of incentives to produce narcotics for the global market.  
  There is a wider concern that the emphasis on repression, militarization and 
enforcement is iatrogenic. The persistence of prohibition thinking and prohibition 
oriented policies in an age of chemical advances, globalization, HIV-AIDS and 
enhanced personal freedom may be doing more harm than good. However, the 
capacity of the current control regime to evolve from a source-focused, 
criminalization approach toward a more liberal, treatment-oriented and 
developmentalist strategy is constrained by the persistence of prohibition attitudes 
among powerful country and regional players, such as China, the U.S., Russia and 
Saudi Arabia. The mechanisms for debate within the drug control system are 
rudimentary and the institutional capacity for flexibility, innovation and radical 
reform is open to question.  
The conceptual frameworks that are used to understand and respond to drugs 
and drug consumption are over a century old. They were framed in a period of 
colonial enterprise, social tension, racism and a lack of medical and scientific 
understanding (Sinha 2001).  That they continue to inform drug policy today is deeply 
problematic. Meaningful change can only come from a revision of founding ideas and 
while some countries have expressed support for such a review, this revolutionary 
  28step is not endorsed by a host of actors owing to narrow vested financial, political and 
national interests.  
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